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I. INTRODUCTION 
Joe, the defendant in this hypothetical case, was charged with 
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, theft, and criminal possession 
of a firearm.  These charges stemmed from his involvement in a forcible 
entry into an apartment.  As Joe entered into the apartment, he demanded 
money from its occupants.  While demanding money, Joe was holding 
what was described as a “skinny weapon” that had a pistol grip in the 
front and rear.  When the police finally arrived on the scene, however, no 
weapon was found.  Nor was any weapon found when Joe was later 
apprehended. 
Joe plead guilty to a charge of aggravated burglary and a reduced 
charge of robbery at his plea hearing.  In exchange to pleading these 
counts, the State agreed to drop the other charges against Joe.  Notably, 
none of the charges Joe pleaded to alleged he used a “deadly weapon” 
during the commission of those crimes.  The district court accepted Joe’s 
pleas, but also made a finding that a firearm was used in the commission 
of the crime. 
If Joe were a resident of a state such as Alaska, he would most likely 
be sentenced to serve concurrent sentences.  These sentences would 
roughly amount to a little under five years of incarceration.  Joe’s 
sentence would be unaffected by the judge’s finding of Joe being in 
possession of a firearm because doing so would violate Joe’s Apprendi1 
rights.2 
                                                        
*  J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Kansas School of Law.  I thank Professor Thomas Stacy for 
his knowledge and insight provided throughout the writing process.  I also thank Mathew Petersen, 
Mackenzie Sheehy, and the staff of the Kansas Law Review for their review of this article along 
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 1.   Under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 466 (2000), any fact that increases either the 
maximum penalty the law permits, or the minimum penalty the law requires, must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 2.   This introductory hypothetical is modeled after the facts set forth in State v. Huey, 399 
P.3d 211 (2017).  A petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has been filed and has 
been placed on the Court’s docket for possible hearing.  
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In this hypothetical, however, Joe is a resident of Kansas.  Joe would 
be sentenced to a length of incarceration comparable to five years.  But 
because the judge found that Joe was in possession of a firearm, Joe 
would also be subject to registering under the Kansas Offender Registry 
Act (KORA) for a minimum of fifteen years.3  The finding of Joe being 
in possession of a firearm while committing his offenses would require 
Joe to register in person at least four times a year paying a fee each time.  
Joe’s Apprendi rights would not be violated, however, because the 
Kansas Supreme Court has held that KORA constitutes a civil regulatory 
scheme rather than criminal punishment.4 
The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision upholding KORA as a civil 
regulatory scheme relies on the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Smith v. Doe.5  In Smith, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (“ASORA”) as a civil regulatory 
scheme rather than a form of punishment.6  In deciding that KORA was a 
civil regulatory scheme rather than punishment, the Kansas Supreme 
Court stated the question presented was whether “there are convincing 
reasons to believe that the United States Supreme Court . . . would view 
the current version of KORA differently than it viewed [the Alaska law] 
in 2003 when it decided Smith[?]”7  Ultimately, the Kansas Supreme 
Court held that if the United States Supreme Court were to view KORA 
as it did in 2003 when it decided Smith, the Court would decide KORA 
was not punitive.8 
If the Supreme Court of the United States were to view KORA 
today, however, the Court should distinguish KORA from ASORA and 
hold that KORA is punitive for two main reasons: (1) empirical evidence 
regarding recidivism and the effect of registries has changed since its 
decision in Smith; and (2) KORA sweeps more broadly than ASORA by 
including all violent offenders and drug offenders in its registry.  In light 
of the possibility of the United States Supreme Court granting certiorari 
                                                        
 3.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(a)(1)(N) (West 2017 & Supp.) (requiring registration for a 
period of fifteen years for anyone convicted “of any person felony and the court makes a finding on 
the record that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of such person felony.”). 
 4.   See State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1130–31 (Kan.), cert. denied, Petersen-Beard 
v. State, 137 S. Ct. 226, 226 (2016); see also State v. Villa, No. 112,107, 2017 WL 3583729 at *1 
(Kan. Aug. 18, 2017) (refusing to review whether KORA constitutes a punishment because the 
challenge was raised for the first time on appeal). 
 5.    Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d at 1129–30. 
 6.   Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 84 (2003). 
 7.   Id. at 1144. 
 8.   Id.  
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in Huey v. Kansas,9 this Comment distinguishes KORA from ASORA 
and argues that the United States Supreme Court should hold that KORA 
constitutes punishment under the United States Constitution. 
Section II of this Comment first introduces the history of Kansas 
offender registries and today’s modern version: KORA.  The section then 
examines the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe upholding 
ASORA.  Finally, the section provides an overview of the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s decision holding that KORA is a civil form of 
regulation rather than criminal punishment. 
Next, Section III analyzes the differences between KORA and 
ASORA.  First, KORA will be distinguished from ASORA by applying 
modern empirical evidence under the Mendoza-Martinez factors.  
Second, KORA will be distinguished from ASORA because KORA 
sweeps more broadly, i.e., KORA includes more offenses subject to 
registry than ASORA.  This Comment then concludes that because the 
provisions of KORA and ASORA can be distinguished, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should distinguish KORA from ASORA and hold that 
KORA constitutes punishment under the United States Constitution. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Whether legislation is civil or punitive determines the rights and 
obligations afforded to defendants by the court.  When legislation is 
characterized as punitive, courts will be obligated to provide the 
necessary criminal procedure protections as demanded by the 
Constitution.  Such procedures include due process, equal protection, 
privilege against self-incrimination, cruel and unusual punishment, right 
to privacy, double jeopardy, ex post facto, right to jury trial, or Apprendi 
rights.10  In contrast, laws that are considered civil or regulatory in nature 
will not be subject to such constitutional demands.11 
Concluding that KORA is civil rather than criminal punishment 
eliminates any constitutional challenges to the statute.  Such 
constitutional rights are only ascertainable if the law in question is 
deemed criminal or imposes “punishment” for constitutional purposes.12  
                                                        
 9.   State v. Huey, 399 P.3d 211 (Kan. 2017), petition for cert. filed, case no. 17-7282 (U.S. 
Jan. 8, 2018).  
 10.   Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex 
Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1101 (2012).  
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Stephen R. McAllister, The Constitutionality of Kansas Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36 
WASHBURN L.J. 419, 437 (1997). 
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As long as the requirements are sufficiently tailored to meet the non-
punitive purpose of the Act, it will remain constitutional.13  Defendants 
must adhere to the registration requirements set forth in the Act without 
any recourse under current precedent. 
A. K.S.A. § 22-4901 
The first Kansas statute governing the registration of sexual 
offenders, known as the Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act 
(HSORA), was enacted in 1993.14  At the outset of this Act, only twice-
convicted or “habitual” sex offenders were required to register.15  Within 
thirty days after a habitual sex offender arrived in a county where they 
intended to reside for longer than thirty days, the offender was required 
to register specific information with the county sheriff.16 
The offender was required to provide their name, date of birth, 
details of their conviction, his photograph, fingerprints and social 
security number.17  Failure to provide the required information within 
thirty days was punished as a class A nonperson misdemeanor.18  An 
offender was required to register for a period of ten years following their 
release from probation or parole.19  Notably, the information provided by 
the offender was not made public and was not subject to the Kansas 
Open Records Act.20  The information could only be accessed by law 
enforcement officials or individuals specifically authorized by law.21 
Further, under HSORA, an offender could apply to be relieved of the 
duty to register at any time by filing for a hearing in the county court of 
his residence.22  If a court found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the offender had been rehabilitated, the court was required to relieve the 
offender of the duty to register.23 
                                                        
 13.   See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws 
that Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2010) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997)).  
 14.   Habitual Sex Offender Registration Act, ch. 253, § 17, 1993 Kan. Sess. Laws 253. 
 15.   Shawn P. Yancy, The History and Future of Offender Registration in Kansas, J. KAN. 
B.A., Oct. 2012, at 34, 35. 
 16.   § 20(a), 1993 Kan. Sess. Laws 253 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904). 
 17.   Id. § 23(a) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907(a)). 
 18.   Id. § 19 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903). 
 19.   Id. § 22(a) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903). 
 20.   Id. § 25 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909). 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   Id. § 24 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4908). 
 23.   Id. 
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One year after its reenactment, the law was transformed into the Sex 
Offender Registration Act (SORA) and required first-time sex offenders 
to register.24  The new Act was prompted by the brutal assault and killing 
of a young woman named Stephanie Schmidt.25  At the time Schmidt’s 
assailant committed the crime, the perpetrator was on parole from 
convictions of rape and aggravated sodomy.26  The public outrage, fueled 
by the publicity of the crime, resulted in the expansion of the prior Act 
by making registration applicable to first time offenders.27  The argument 
that sex offenders presented an increased recidivism rate gained credence 
as the public fear grew.28 
Under SORA, an offender convicted of a sexually motivated crime, 
ranging from stealing a woman’s underwear during a burglary to rape,29 
was required to register for a ten-year period.30  An offender convicted 
for a second time of a sexually motivated crime was required to register 
for life.31  Such registration was made open and available to the public at 
the local sheriff’s office or through the Kansas Open Records Act.32  The 
time period for registration after relocation was shortened from 30 days 
to 15 days.33 
The Act was amended in 1996 to require offenders to provide 
additional information about the crime and themselves, including the sex 
and age of the victim, the offender’s address, the offender’s DNA 
exemplars, the offender’s driver’s license and vehicle information, the 
offender’s occupation and name of his employer, and any identifying 
characteristics of the offender such as race, hair and eye color, scars and 
blood type.34  For the first time, the offender’s home address and place of 
employment were made available to the public. 
                                                        
 24.   Yancy, supra note 15, at 35. 
 25.   Rick Kittel, K.S.A. 22-4901 et seq.—Offender Registration in Kansas, J. KAN. B.A., June-
July 2000, at 28, 29. 
 26.   Id.; see also State v. Gideon, 894 P.2d 850, 855 (Kan. 1995). 
 27.   Kittel, supra note 25, at 29. 
 28.   Id. at 29 n.12. 
 29.   See State v. Patterson, 963 P.2d 436, 437 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998), rev. denied (Sept 14, 
1998). 
 30.   Sex Offender Registration Act, ch. 107, § 5, 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws 107 (current version at 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(a)). 
 31.   Id. § 5 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(c)). 
 32.   Id. § 7 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4909).  The Kansas Open Records Act is 
found at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-215–54 (2008). 
 33.   Id. § 3(a) (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904). 
 34.   Sex Offender Registration Act, ch. 224, § 5, 1996 Kan. Sess. Laws 224 (current version at 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907). 
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In 1997, the Kansas Legislature renamed the Act the Kansas 
Offender Registration Act (KORA) and slowly started to expand the 
reach of registration.35  The Act was revised to reach beyond sex 
offenders to include certain violent crimes and personal offenses against 
victims under the age of eighteen.36  The category of sex offenders 
included those convicted of certain listed sex offenses, those convicted of 
comparable offenses from other jurisdictions, those convicted of an 
attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit one of the listed sex 
offenses, or those convicted of sexually motivated crimes.37  Violent 
offenders consisted of those convicted of a homicide, those convicted of 
comparable offenses from other jurisdictions, or those convicted of an 
attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit a homicide.38 
Under KORA, offenders’ ability to petition the court for relief from 
registration was seriously limited.  Only those who had already 
registered for a period of ten years for each conviction requiring 
registration were eligible to seek relief from the registration 
requirement.39  Further, upon petitioning for relief, the offender was 
required to provide evidence documenting any treatment for a mental 
illness or personality disorder.40 
In 1999, the Act was amended to create a category called 
“aggravated offenses” for which an offender was required to register for 
a lifetime, even if it was their first and only offense.41  “Aggravated 
offenses” were defined as a sexual act, or any attempt, solicitation or 
conspiracy to commit a sexual act of penetration with a victim of any age 
through the use of force or threat of violence, or a sexual act or any 
attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit a sexual act of penetration 
with a victim less than fourteen years of age.42 
The penalty for violating the Act was raised to a severity level 10, 
nonperson felony offense.43  At this time, the Act required registration 
within ten days of relocation to another county.44  Relief from offender 
                                                        
 35.   Yancy, supra note 15, at 35. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Kansas Offender Registration Act, ch. 181, § 8, 1997 Kan. Sess. Laws 181 (current version 
at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(b)–(c)). 
 38.   Id. § 8 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(e)). 
 39.   Id. § 13 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(e)). 
 40.   Id. 
 41.   Kansas Offender Registration Act, ch. 164, § 33, 1999 Kan. Sess. Laws 164 (current 
version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(d)). 
 42.   Id. § 29 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(d)). 
 43.   Id. § 30 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903). 
 44.   Id. § 10 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904). 
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registration was further restricted to only first time offenders who had 
not been convicted of an aggravated offense, and had registered for a 
period of at least ten years under the Act.45 
In 2001, the Act added the requirement of sexually violent predators 
and new permanent residents of Kansas who were offenders required to 
register in their original jurisdiction to register.46  In 2002, the Act was 
amended to require juvenile sex offenders to register until they reached 
the age of eighteen.47  In 2005, provisions were added to notify schools 
and childcare facilities if offenders were registered near their facilities.48  
The publisher was required to distinguish between sex offenders and 
violent or drug offenders.49 
In 2006, failing to register became a level 5, person felony.50  Failing 
to register for more than 30 days created a new offense and subsequent 
offenses were committed for each thirty-day period thereafter.51  In 2007, 
the Legislature added three drug offenses—but provided an exception if 
the offender’s possession or manufacture was for personal use.52 
In 2011, the personal use exception was removed.53  KORA now 
mandates the registration of not only sex offenders upon conviction, but 
violent offenders and drug offenders as well.54  Under KORA, such 
offenders may be subject to registration for fifteen-years,55 twenty-five 
years,56 or life57 depending on the offense committed.  The informal 
                                                        
 45.   Id. § 34 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4908). 
 46.   Kansas Offender Registration Act, ch. 208, § 11, 2001 Kan. Sess. Laws 208 (current 
version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904). 
 47.   Yancy, supra note 15, at 35. 
 48.   Kansas Offender Registration Act, ch. 202, § 2, 2005 Kan. Sess. Laws 202. 
 49.   Id. 
 50.   Kansas Offender Registration Act, ch. 212, § 20, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 212 (current 
version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903). 
 51.   Id. 
 52.   Yancy, supra note 15, at 35. 
 53.   Id.  
 54.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906 (West 2017 & Supp.). 
 55.   Id. § 22-4906(a)(1)(A)–(R).  Such convictions subjected to fifteen-years of registry include 
sexual battery, adultery, promoting the sale of sexual relations, patronizing a prostitute, lewd and 
lascivious behavior, capital murder, murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, 
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, criminal restraint, unlawful manufacture or 
attempting such of any controlled substance, possession of ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, red 
phosphorus, lithium metal, sodium metal, iodine, anhydrous ammonia, pressurized ammonia or 
phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers or salts of isomers with the intent to use the product to 
manufacture a controlled substance, any attempt, conspiracy or criminal solicitation, and conviction 
of any person felony and the court makes a finding on the record that a deadly weapon was used in 
the commission of such personal felony.  Id. 
 56.   Id. § 22-4906(b)(1)(A)–(J).  Such convictions subjected to twenty-five years of registry 
include criminal sodomy, indecent solicitation of a child, electronic solicitation, aggravated incest, 
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reporting period was lowered to three days to comply with federal 
mandate established in the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act 
of 2006.58 
In 2011, the information required to be reported by offenders was 
expanded and now includes: 1) name and aliases; 2) date and city, state 
and country of birth and any aliases; 3) title and statute number of each 
offense, date of each conviction and court case numbers; 4) city, county, 
state or country of conviction; 5) sex and date of birth of each victim; 6) 
current residential address, anticipated future residence and any 
temporary lodging information; 7) all telephone numbers at which the 
offender may be contacted; 8) Social Security number, and all alias 
Social Security numbers; 9) identifying characteristics, such as race, 
ethnicity, skin tone, sex, age, height, weight, hair and eye color, scars, 
tattoos and blood type; 10) occupation and name, address or addresses 
and telephone number of employer(s) and any anticipated employer(s); 
11) all current driver’s licenses or identification cards, including a 
photocopy of all such driver’s licenses or identification cards and their 
numbers, states or issuance and expiration dates; 12) all vehicle 
information including license plate number, registration number and 
description of any vehicle owned or driven by the offender; 13) license 
plate number, registration number or description of any aircraft or 
watercraft owned or operated by the offender; 14) all professional 
licenses, designations and certifications; 15) documentation of any 
treatment received for mental abnormality, illness or personality disorder 
of the offender; 16) photograph(s); 17) fingerprints and palm prints; 18) 
any and all schools attended or expected to be attended and locations and 
telephone numbers; 19) any and all email addresses, any and all online 
identities used on the internet or any information relating to any 
membership in any online social networks; 20) all travel and immigration 
documents; and 21) name and telephone number of the offender’s 
probation, parole or community corrections officer.59 
                                                        
indecent liberties with a child, unlawful sexual relations, sexual exploitation of a child, aggravated 
sexual battery, promoting prostitution, and any attempt, conspiracy, or criminal solicitation.  Id.  
 57.   An offender subsequently convicted of a second offense requiring registration will result in 
lifetime registration. Id. § 22-4906(c).  Convictions subjected to lifetime registration include rape, 
aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, criminal 
sodomy, aggravated criminal sodomy, aggravated human trafficking, sexual exploitation of a child, 
promoting prostitution, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, commercial sexual exploitation of a 
child, or any attempt, conspiracy or criminal solicitation.  Id. § 22-4906(d)(1)–(12). 
 58.   Id. § 5 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4905(b)). 
 59.   Id. § 7 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907). 
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A graduated punishment scheme was enacted in 2011 whereby an 
initial failure to register is a level 6, person felony; a second failure is a 
level 5, person felony; and a third or subsequent failure to register is a 
level 3, person felony.60  An aggravated failure to register, a failure 
lasting more than 180 consecutive days, is a level 3, person felony.61  
Every 180 days of failing to register constitutes a new and separate 
offense.62 
B. Civil Regulatory Scheme vs. Punitive: The United States Supreme 
Court’s Solution 
While some legislation can be clearly defined as a regulatory scheme 
or criminal punishment, legislation regarding offender registries blurs the 
line.  The Supreme Court sought to clarify the distinction between civil 
and criminal legislation in regard to sex offender laws in Smith v. Doe.63  
In Smith, the petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the Alaska 
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause64 of the United States Constitution.  The Ex Post Facto Clause 
specifically prohibits retroactive application of laws that demand greater 
punishment than the law at the time the offense was committed.65  The 
petitioners argued that ASORA violated this clause because even though 
they were convicted of their crimes before the passage of ASORA, the 
Act required their registration.66  In order to successfully make an ex post 
facto violation claim, however, petitioners had to prove that ASORA was 
criminal punishment.67  Since precedent held that sex offender registries 
were civil regulatory schemes, the Smith Court had to analyze the 
specific requirements set forth in ASORA.68 
Under ASORA, offenders convicted prior to and after the 
establishment of the Act were required to register.69  ASORA had two 
components: (1) a registration requirement for offenders; and (2) a 
notification system.70  Offenders who were required to register under 
                                                        
 60.   Id. § 3 (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903(c)). 
 61.   Id. (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903(c)(2)). 
 62.   Id. (current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4903(b)). 
 63.   See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 84 (2003). 
 64.   Id. 
 65.   U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
 66.   Smith, 538 U.S. at 91–92 (2003). 
 67.   Id. 
 68.   Smith, 538 U.S. at 89–91. 
 69.   Id. at 89.  
 70.   Id. at 90.  
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ASORA included those convicted of sex offenses and child kidnapping.71  
Under ASORA, offenders were subject to either a registration length of 
fifteen years or reporting quarterly for life.72  In order to report in 
compliance with ASORA, offenders were required to provide written 
verification of the offender’s address and update any changes to the 
information required by registration.73  Such information included the 
name of the sex offender, aliases, identifying features, photograph, 
fingerprints, address, place of employment, date of birth, conviction 
information, driver’s license number, information about vehicles to 
which he has access, and post-conviction treatment history.74  This 
information was then was given to the Alaska Department of Public 
Safety to make public.75  While ASORA did not specify how the 
information was to be made public, Alaska chose to make the 
information available on the internet.76 
The Smith Court applied its “intent-effects” test to determine whether 
the Alaska Legislature intended to establish a civil regulatory scheme or 
criminal punishment.  If the legislature intended to impose punishment—
the inquiry would end there.  However, if the legislature intended to 
enact a civil regulatory scheme, then the Court would proceed to evaluate 
the statute to determine whether the effects of the statute were so 
punitive that it overrides the legislature’s intention for it to be civil.77  In 
order to determine whether a statute had overridden the legislature’s 
intent to create a civil regulatory scheme, the Court applied the factor test 
developed from their decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez.78 
The Court first analyzed ASORA under the “intent-effects” test by: 
“(1) determining whether the legislature’s intention was to enact a . . . 
regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive and, if so, (2) 
examin[ing] whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose 
                                                        
 71.   ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).  
 72.   ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.020(a)(1)–(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).  Offenders 
convicted of non-aggravated sex offense or a single child kidnapping were subject to annual 
reporting for fifteen years.  Id. § 12.63.020(a)(2). 
 73.   ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010(d)(1)–(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
 74.   Id. § 12.63.010(b)(1)(A)–(I). 
 75.   ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.087(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). 
 76.   Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 91 (2003). 
 77.   Id. at 92. 
 78.  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).  In Mendoza-Martinez, the 
Court held that the deprivation of nationality as a result of remaining outside the country for 
purposes of evading military service was a form of punishment and therefore unconstitutional.  Id. at 
186.  While the Mendoza-Martinez Court did not decide the issue of the constitutionality of sex 
offender registries, the Court did establish a seven-factor test to distinguish whether a statute is 
regulatory or punitive.  Id. at 168–69. 
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or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.”79  The Court 
based its conclusion on the legislature’s expressed objective of ASORA 
in the statute itself.80  In ASORA, the Alaska Legislature stated that the 
Legislature had found sex offenders to “pose a high risk of reoffending” 
warranting a set of laws to protect the public from sex offenders.81  This 
express objective, combined with the fact that ASORA was contained in 
the State’s Health, Safety, and Housing Code, led the Court to conclude 
that the intent of the Alaska Legislature was to create a civil regulatory 
scheme to promote public safety.82 
To determine whether the effects of ASORA were punitive enough 
to override the Alaska Legislature’s intent of creating a civil regulatory 
scheme, the effects of the legislation were then analyzed by the 
Mendoza-Martinez factors.83  The Mendoza-Martinez factors inquire 
whether the regulatory scheme: (1) “has been regarded in our history and 
traditions as a punishment;” (2) “imposes an affirmative disability or 
restraint;” (3) “promotes the traditional aims of punishment;” (4) “has a 
rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose;” or (5) “is excessive with 
respect to its purpose.”84 
First, the Smith Court held that ASORA and sex offender registries 
alike were not punitive because registries have not been embedded into 
our society as traditional forms of punishment.85  The Court limited the 
definition of “traditional punishments” to only embody “colonial 
punishments” such as banishment, shaming, and branding.86  Sex 
offender registries, however, were distinguished from these types of 
traditional punishments; the Smith Court stated that while some forms of 
colonial punishments such as shaming were meant to inflict public 
                                                        
 79.   Doe v. Thompson, 373 P.3d 750, 761–62 (Kan.) overruled by State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 
P.3d 1127 (Kan. 2016) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–95. 
 81.   Id. at 93 (citing Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, ch. 41, § 1, 1994 Alaska Sess. 
Laws 41 (current version at ALASKA STAT. ANN. 12.63.010 (West 2007 & Supp.))). 
 82.  Id. at 92–97. 
 83.  Id. at 97. 
 84.   Id. at 97.  The Supreme Court dismissed two of the seven factors—“whether the regulation 
comes into play only on a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which is applies is already 
a crime . . . .”  Id. at 105.  The Court declared these factors had “little weight” given that they 
inquired whether past conduct, i.e. a crime, had been committed. Id.  Committing a crime is the 
necessary beginning point of registration, and the “obligations the statute imposes are the 
responsibility of registration, a duty not predicated upon some present or repeated violation.” Id. 
 85.   Id. at 97. 
 86.   Id. at 97–98.  See also Andrea E. Yang, Historical Criminal Punishments, Punitive Aims 
and Un-“Civil” Post-Custody Sanctions on Sex Offenders: Reviving the Ex Post Facto Clause as a 
Bulwark of Personal Security and Private Rights, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1299, 1332 (2007) (discussing 
the “historical punishment factor”). 
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disgrace, sex offender registries cannot be analogized with these forms of 
punishment.87  Sex offender registries contrast the traditional punishment 
of shaming because, although public shame and humiliation may result 
from the dissemination of registry information, the resulting stigma from 
the registry is not an integral part of the objective regulatory scheme.88  
The Court held that the purpose of registration notification is to inform 
the public for its own safety and the “attendant humiliation is but a 
collateral consequence . . . .”89 
By limiting “traditional” forms of punishment to those dating back to 
the colonial period, the Smith Court rejected any arguments that 
analogized parole and probation to the punitive nature of sex offender 
registries.  Thus, the Court held that registries did not constitute 
punishment because they did not reflect historical practices of 
punishment. 
The Smith Court also rejected arguments that ASORA’s registration 
requirements imposed an affirmative disability or restraint on 
offenders.90  One aspect the Court evaluated under this factor was 
ASORA’s lack of residency restriction on offenders.  The Court stated 
that the lack of physical restraint on offenders weighed in favor of this 
factor supporting ASORA’s regulatory purpose.91  The Court also looked 
to the presence of non-physical restraints, such as employment.92  
Despite the reporting requirements and the public dissemination of 
registry information, the Court held that the Act did “not restrain 
activities sex offenders may pursue” and “leaves them free to change 
jobs or residences.”93 
The Smith Court was unwilling to concede that the deterrent effect of 
sex offender registries could qualify the scheme as furthering the 
traditional aims of punishment.94  The Court feared that recognizing 
deterrence as a purely punitive measure would result in challenges 
against all civil regulatory.95  Doing so would arguably “severely 
undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation.”96  
                                                        
 87.   Smith, 538 U.S. at 98–99.  
 88.   Id.  
 89.   Id. at 99. 
 90.   Id. at 100–02.  
 91.   Id. at 100. 
 92.   Id. 
 93.   Id.  
 94.   Id. at 102. 
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Id. 
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For this reason, the Court held that the deterrence effect of ASORA does 
not evidence punishment.97 
The Court also rejected the argument that ASORA’s mechanism for 
assigning reporting requirement lengths based on the type of 
conviction—a practice that is common for most states—imposed a 
retributive effect.98  The Court instead upheld the application of varying 
reporting lengths based upon conviction because the categories reflected 
the risk posed, and was not punishment for the extent of the 
wrongdoing.99  Further, the Court explained that the broad categories and 
their corresponding length of reporting requirements were “reasonably 
related to the danger of recidivism . . . .”100  The categorical 
implementation of reporting length was therefore seen as consistent with 
ASORA’s regulatory objective, rather than a retributive form of 
punishment.101 
According to the Smith Court, the “rational relationship to a non-
punitive purpose” factor is the most significant factor in determining 
whether registrations are regulatory or punitive.102  The Court held that 
ASORA’s non-punitive purpose of “public safety, which [was] advanced 
by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community” 
was legitimate.103  This reasoning reflected the Court’s outlook on sex 
offenders as a continuing and dangerous threat to communities.  In the 
hopes of protecting these communities, the Court ruled that public 
dissemination of offender information must be upheld as legitimate.104 
Lastly, the Court examined whether ASORA and its requirements 
were excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose.105  Under this factor, 
the Smith Court focuses on the “dangerousness” of sex offenders “as a 
class” given their “substantial risk of recidivism.”106  The Court based its 
assertions on a citation to the U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau of Statistics 
stating that “[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders is 
‘frightening and high.’”107  With this, the Court justified any punitive 
                                                        
 97.   Id. 
 98.   Id. 
 99.   Id. 
 100.   Id. 
 101.   Id. at 102–03. 
 102.   Id.  
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. at 103. 
 105.   Id. 
 106.   Id. 
 107.   Id. 
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effect ASORA had on offenders by classifying them as a dangerous 
group posing a likely threat in the future.108 
The Smith Court therefore held that every factor under the Mendoza-
Martinez test weighed in favor of ASORA being a civil regulatory 
scheme rather than a form of criminal punishment.109  Today, the Court 
has yet to revisit the issue and overturn its precedent set forth in Smith. 
C. The Constitutionality of KORA 
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet 
examined the most recent version of KORA under the United States 
Constitution, the Kansas Supreme Court has.  Current precedent set forth 
by the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Petersen-Beard holds 
that KORA is not punitive for the purposes of applying the federal 
Constitution.110  In its holding, the Kansas Supreme Court made clear 
that the Petersen-Beard decision was to apply to all constitutional 
challenges as to KORA being punitive rather than a civil regulatory 
scheme.111 
The decision to hold KORA as a legitimate civil regulatory scheme, 
however, did not come unanimously.  In fact, in order for the Kansas 
Supreme Court to reach this decision, it had to overturn three decisions 
that were issued the same day: State v. Buser,  State v. Redmond, and 
Doe v. Thompson.112  The story behind how this became possible is told 
in Justice Malone’s concurring opinion in State v. Watkins.113 
While Justice Malone sided with the majority in State v. Watkins, 
holding that KORA is not punishment, he expressed his disagreement 
with the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Petersen-Beard.114  
Justice Malone stated that he sided with the majority in Watkins purely 
                                                        
 108.   Id. 
 109.   Id. at 105–06.  
 110.   State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1149 (Kan.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 226 (2016).  
 111.   Id. at 1130 (stating that “there exists no analytical distinction between or among the 
different constitutional contexts in which the question of punishment versus a civil regulatory 
scheme can arise.”). 
 112.   Id. at 1131.  For further detail on the decisions overturned in Petersen-Beard see Doe v. 
Thompson, 373 P.3d 750, 771 (Kan. 2016) (holding the 2011 amendments to KORA were punitive 
in effect and its application to sex offenders committing crimes before July, 2011 violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause); State v. Buser, 371 P.3d 886, 892 (Kan. 2016) (holding that the defendant could 
not be subject to KORA without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Redmond, 371 P.3d 
900, 904 (Kan. 2016) (holding that KORA was punitive and applying the KORA retroactively to sex 
offenders violated the Ex Post Facto Clause).  
 113.   State v. Watkins, 401 P.3d 607, 609–11 (Kan. 2017) (Malone, J., concurring). 
 114.   Id.  
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for the purpose of stare decisis.115  Justice Malone, however, joined the 
majority opinions in State v. Buser, State v. Redmond, Doe v. Thompson, 
and State v. Charles holding that the 2011 KORA statutory scheme was 
punitive.116  Justice Malone temporarily sat on the Kansas Supreme 
Court as a senior judge due to a vacancy on the bench.117  Before the 
opinions of these cases were filed, Justice Caleb Stegall had been 
appointed to fill the vacancy on the Kansas Supreme Court bench.118  
After his appointment, the balance of the issue concerning whether 
KORA was punishment shifted—thus creating the Petersen-Beard 
decision holding that KORA is not punishment overruling Buser, 
Redmond, Thompson, and Charles.119 
At the time Watkins was decided, Justice Malone had stepped in 
again to fill a vacancy on the bench.  This vacancy, however, was 
temporary and due to the recusal of Justice Stegall.120  Justice Stegall 
recused himself from Watkins because as a former Judge for the Kansas 
Court of Appeals, he sat on the bench that rendered the per curiam 
decision the Kansas Supreme Court was now reviewing.121  Therefore, 
recognizing that the permanent Kansas Supreme Court no longer sided 
with his interests, Justice Malone joined the majority in the interests of 
upholding stare decisis.122 
D. KORA Under the Intent-Effects Test 
The current precedent in Kansas is State v. Petersen-Beard, holding 
that KORA is not punitive.  In State v. Petersen-Beard, the nineteen-
year-old appellant Petersen-Beard sought to challenge his lifetime post 
release as a sex offender under KORA as cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of Section 9 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.123  The new balance in the 
Court resulted in overturning the Court’s prior holdings considering 
KORA as a form of punishment.124 
                                                        
 115.   Id. at 610. 
 116.   Id.  
 117.   Id. at 609. 
 118.   Id.  
 119.   Id. 
 120.   Id. at 610. 
 121.   Id.  
 122.   Id. 
 123.   State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1129 (Kan.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 226 (2016).  
 124.   Id. 
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In its opinion, the Court quoted the dissent in Thompson, adopting its 
reasoning in toto.125  In doing so, the majority relied heavily on the Smith 
Court’s analysis of ASORA under the “intent-effects” test. 
In examining the intent of the Kansas Legislature, the Kansas 
Supreme Court reached the conclusion that the Legislature intended for 
KORA to serve as a civil regulatory scheme.126  While KORA contains 
no express statement of legislative intent or purpose, the Petersen-Beard 
Court agreed with the Kansas Supreme Court’s former decision in State 
v. Myers127 that the legislative history suggested that KORA was 
intended to serve as a public safety measure.128  The Court therefore 
concluded that the Kansas Legislature enacted KORA for the non-
punitive purpose of creating a civil regulatory scheme to ensure public 
safety.129 
The Petersen-Beard Court then evaluated whether the punitive 
effects of KORA could override the Legislature’s intent of creating a 
civil regulatory scheme.130  The Petersen-Beard Court followed the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith utilizing the Mendoza-
Martinez factors.131  In doing so, the Kansas Supreme Court followed the 
United States Supreme Court in Smith without any regard to the 
distinctions between KORA and ASORA.132 
Like the Smith Court, the Petersen-Beard Court determined that 
every factor weighed in favor of the Mendoza-Martinez test weighing in 
favor of KORA being punitive.133  First, the Petersen-Beard Court 
determined that the effects of KORA do not resemble the historical 
forms of punishment; the Court did so by quoting large portions of the 
Smith Court’s decision.134  In doing so, the Petersen-Beard Court largely 
adopts the Smith Court’s rationale that any humiliation or public shame 
that comes from the dissemination of information is merely incidental to 
the regulatory agenda of KORA.135 
                                                        
 125.   Id. at 1131. 
 126.   Doe v. Thompson, 373 P.3d 750, 761–62 (2016) overruled by Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d at 
1128. 
 127.   State v. Myers, 923 P.3d 1024, 1024 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1118, 1118 
(1997). 
 128.   Thompson, 373 P.3d at 761.  
 129.   Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d at 1130. 
 130.   Id. at 1130–31. 
 131.   Id.  
 132.   Id.  
 133.   Id. at 1133. 
 134.   Id. at 1133–34. 
 135.   Id.  
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Next, the Petersen-Beard Court again deferred to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith to evaluate the affirmative disability or 
restraint KORA puts on offenders.136  The Petersen-Beard Court noted 
that KORA, like ASORA, imposed no residency restrictions.137  The 
Court then distinguished KORA from registries with residency 
restrictions that have been held as unconstitutional affirmative restraint 
and disability.138  Further, the Petersen-Beard Court rejected any 
argument that the requirements of KORA such as paying a $20 
registration fee and in person reporting requirements restrict the freedom 
of offenders to move.139 
The Petersen-Beard Court then analyzed whether KORA promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment.140  Citing to the Smith Court’s 
opinion, the Petersen-Beard Court found that the fact that KORA may 
deter offenders from committing offenses is not enough to change the 
intent of the regulatory scheme into criminal punishment.141  In 
addressing the increased length of time that offenders are required to 
register under KORA in comparison to ASORA, the Petersen-Beard 
Court qualified the requirement as being reasonably related to the danger 
of recidivism posed by sex offenders.142 
The Petersen-Beard Court further cites to Smith stating that KORA 
has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose of promoting public 
safety.143  While the Petersen-Beard Court recognized that the risk of 
recidivism may have been overstated in Smith, it did not change its 
conclusion.  The Court stated that this would not refute the safety interest 
in monitoring offender presence in the community.144 
Lastly, the Petersen-Beard Court stated that KORA was not 
excessive in relation to its regulatory purpose because the Smith Court 
held states are not precluded from “making reasonable categorical 
judgments that certain crimes should have a particular regulatory 
consequence.”145  The Petersen-Beard Court added to the Smith quote by 
                                                        
 136.   Id. at 1137–38. 
 137.   Id. 
 138.   Id.  
 139.   Id. at 1138.  
 140.   Id. at 1139. 
 141.   Id.  
 142.   Id.  
 143.   Id. at 1139–40.  
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Id. at 1140.  
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stating that the requirements of KORA are not excessive given KORA’s 
public safety purpose.146 
While Smith might be the most current precedent, the Petersen-
Beard Court misapplied the Mendoza-Martinez factors in predicting how 
the United States Supreme Court would rule on the issue of KORA.  
Even under Smith precedent, the Court should distinguish KORA from 
ASORA and find it punitive. 
III. ANALYSIS 
KORA is easily distinguishable from ASORA and the Supreme 
Court of the United States should distinguish its ruling on KORA from 
its decision in Smith.  The Court’s analysis of KORA should differ under 
the Mendoza-Martinez factors for two main reasons: (1) empirical 
evidence regarding recidivism and the effect of registries has changed 
since its decision in Smith; and (2) KORA sweeps more broadly than the 
Alaska statute analyzed in Smith by including violent offenders and drug 
offenders under its registry.  Specifically, an analysis of KORA should 
differ from that in Smith regarding two of the Mendoza-Martinez factors.  
Given KORA’s distinguishable features, the Supreme Court of the 
United States should analyze the “rational connection to a non-punitive 
purpose” factor and the “excessive in relation to a regulatory purpose” 
factor as weighing in favor of KORA being punitive. 
A. Modern Empirical Evidence 
The Kansas Supreme Court misapplies the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors in predicting that the United States Supreme Court would hold 
KORA as a civil regulatory scheme instead of criminal punishment.  In 
Petersen-Beard, the Kansas Supreme Court fails to account for empirical 
evidence of recidivism and the effectiveness of registries developed since 
Smith that the United States Supreme Court would now have at its 
disposal.  In light of new scientific evidence, the United States Supreme 
Court should be evaluating KORA and its requirements with much less 
weight given to the public safety and prevention aspect of registries.  
Given that KORA’s requirements are distinguishable from the 
requirements of ASORA by placing even more restrictions on registrants, 
the United States Supreme Court must weigh the punitive effects of 
                                                        
 146.   Id.  
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KORA against a weakened argument that registries are legitimized by 
public safety concerns. 
The Smith Court defended the punitive effects of registries stating 
that ASORA’s requirements are “reasonably related to the danger of 
recidivism, and . . . consistent with the regulatory objective.”147  The 
recidivism rate of sex offenders was described as “frightening and high” 
and was used to evidence their “dangerousness as a class.”148  In the 
years since Smith, however, the Court’s reference to the threatening 
recidivism rate of sex offenders has been referred to as “junk science.”149  
Hundreds of scientific studies have sought to find the truth about sex 
offenders and recidivism rates.150  The studies consistently show that sex 
offenders have one of the lowest rates of same-crime recidivism than any 
other offense category.151 
Even the source of the Smith Court’s “frightening and high” 
recidivism rate citation has repudiated his statement saying it is 
“absolutely incorrect.”152  Robert Longo, a counselor at an Oregon 
prison, was the source of this pseudoscientific assertion based upon no 
study or supporting reference.153  Longo, whose assertion appeared in a 
1986 Psychology Today article, stated that his article does not reflect 
recent research and should not be used as a basis for public policy.154 
Further, studies on recidivism in sex offenders propose that collateral 
consequences of sex offender registrations might actually undermine the 
goal of increasing public safety.155  Researchers now believe that sex 
offender registration laws may actually increase recidivism by 
exacerbating the risk factors associated with committing crime by 
offenders subject to the laws.156  Findings suggest that registration 
                                                        
 147.   Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003). 
 148.   Id. at 103.  
 149.   David Feige, When Junk Science About Sex Offenders Infects the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/opinion/when-junk-science-about-
sex-offenders-infects-the-supreme-court.html. 
 150.   Id. 
 151.   Id. 
 152.   Jacob Sullum, “I’m Appalled,” Says Source of Phony Number Used to Justify Harsh Sex 
Offender Laws, REASON (Sept. 14, 2017, 9:15 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/09/14/im-appalled-
says-source-of-pseudo-statis (referencing David Feige’s documentary, UNTOUCHABLE (Blue Lawn 
Productions 2016)). 
 153.   Id. 
 154.   Id. 
 155.   See J. J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release Regulations and Sex Offender 
Recidivism, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1077–78 (2016) (discussing public safety and actual effects of 
sex offender registration laws). 
 156.   Id. 
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requirements imposed by sex offender legislation may actually 
destabilize sex offenders.157  Sex offenders then become more likely to 
report levels of depressive symptoms and hopelessness that are higher 
than those of the general population.158  Sex offenders experiencing these 
symptoms are associated with an increased risk of reoffending.159 
The United States Supreme Court should not give deference to 
KORA serving as a safety measure protecting the public.  Instead, the 
United States Supreme Court must weigh the onerous requirements of 
KORA against little, if any, evidence that KORA legitimately serves a 
non-punitive purpose of providing safety for the public. 
In Does #1–5 v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit took a progressive step in 
reviewing sex offender registry legislation by examining 
interdisciplinary research to address the issue of whether the Michigan 
Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the United States Constitution.160  While evaluating SORA 
under the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Sixth Circuit addressed the 
factor considered the most important by the Smith Court—the “rational 
relation to a non-punitive purpose” factor—by applying modern research 
on sex offenders and recidivism rates.161  The Sixth Circuit undermined 
SORA’s non-punitive purpose by citing to research stating that “offense-
based public registration has, at best, no impact on recidivism.”162  The 
Sixth Circuit then added that some research in the record provides 
evidence that “laws such as SORA actually increase the risk of 
recidivism . . . .”163  This research, paired with the fact that SORA made 
no individualized assessment of the dangerousness of each registrant, 
significantly undermined the Smith Court’s decision to grant deference to 
the regulatory attempt of sex offender registrations.  The Sixth Circuit 
therefore concluded that the most significant factor in determining 
whether a law is punitive—according to the Smith Court—actually 
weighs in favor of SORA constituting punishment given the lack of 
evidence supporting the success of registries providing public safety.164  
                                                        
 157.   Elizabeth L. Jeglic et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Depression and Hopelessness 
Among Sex Offenders Subject to Community Notification and Residence Restriction Legislation, 37 
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 46, 55 (2012). 
 158.   Id. 
 159.   Id. 
 160.   See Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 701–06 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
55, 55 (2017).  
 161.   Id. at 704–05. 
 162.   Id. at 704. 
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 164.   Id. at 704–05.  
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The Supreme Court of the United States seemingly approved of the Sixth 
Circuit’s application of modern research of sex offenders and sex 
offender registries by denying certiorari.165 
Like the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court of the United States 
should evaluate the legitimacy of KORA as a functioning regulatory 
scheme rather than punishment by applying modern research.  The Court 
should apply the empirical evidence indicating that sex offenders do not 
have a high risk of recidivism and that registries are ineffective in 
deterring recidivism.166  This would significantly undermine any 
argument that KORA’s requirements are justified by the promotion of 
public safety because sex offenders “constitute a class of criminals that 
[are] likely to reoffend.”167  Given that KORA imposes stricter 
requirements than ASORA, the Court should be able to distinguish 
KORA from ASORA and hold that KORA is punitive without 
overturning Smith v. Doe. 
1. Applying the Mendoza-Martinez Factors to KORA Using Modern 
Research 
The Mendoza-Martinez factors most affected by modern research 
would be KORA’s rational relation to a non-punitive purpose and 
KORA’s excessiveness in respect to its purpose.  These factors require 
the Court to weigh KORA’s requirements that are distinguishable from 
those of ASORA analyzed in Smith.  These distinguishable 
characteristics would be analyzed against evidence of sex offenders 
posing a low risk of recidivism and the ineffectiveness of registries 
lowering recidivism rates. 
The most obvious distinction between KORA and ASORA is that 
KORA requires in-person registration at a minimum of four times a year 
in every county where the offender resides, maintains employment, or 
attends school.168  KORA registrants must not only physically report to a 
                                                        
 165.   Snyder v. Does #1–5, 138 S. Ct. 55, 55 (2017). 
 166.   See Prescott, supra note 155 at 1039–40 (discussing sex offender registration statutes and 
effect on recidivism); see also David Feige, supra note 149, at 1077–78 (explaining misconceptions 
about effects of sex offender registration statutes). 
 167.   State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1139 (Kan.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 226 (2016).  
 168.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4905(b)(1)–(2) (West 2017) (emphasis added).  Transient 
offenders, however, must report in person every thirty days totaling approximately three hundred 
and sixty dollars. Id. § 22-4905(f), (l).  Offenders must also register in person within three days of 
any information change such as employment status, residency or school change, or any information 
listed in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907(b) (West 2017) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4905(g), (h) (West 
2017). 
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law enforcement agency, but must also pay a fee of twenty dollars each 
time.169  ASORA, however, did not require in-person registration and did 
not per se require payment upon registration.170  ASORA only required 
offenders to submit written verification one to four times a year, 
depending on the severity of the offense.171  While the burden of written 
registration one to four times a year was not viewed as excessive in 
regards to protecting the public from a then “dangerous” class of 
offenders, the Court’s analysis should be significantly different today.  
The Court should now be weighing a much more onerous requirement 
against a weaker argument of promoting public safety in light of research 
providing that registration requirements do little to help promote public 
safety and actually facilitate reoffending.172 
2. Rational Connection to a Non-Punitive Purpose 
In using recent empirical research, the Court should conclude that 
KORA fails to provide a rational relation to accomplishing a non-
punitive purpose.173  Similar to that of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Does #1–5 v. Snyder, the use of modern empirical data must negate any 
argument that burdensome requirements of registries are justified by 
“frightening and high” risks of recidivism among sex offenders.174 
In Does #1-5 v. Snyder, Michigan’s sex offender registry was 
distinguished from ASORA because Michigan imposed residency 
restrictions for registrants.  Although both KORA and ASORA do not 
impose residency restrictions, KORA can still be distinguished.  Given 
that KORA imposes more onerous requirements such as reporting in 
person, longer registration terms, additional information, per se fees, 
notice to travel outside of the United States, annual driver’s license 
                                                        
 169.   Id. § 22-4905(l) (2017).  ASORA allowed the department of public safety to adopt a fee to 
register but required that the fees be based upon the actual costs and to be set at a level that did not 
discourage offenders from registering.  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.087(d)(3) (2007 & Supp. 
2014). 
 170.   ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010(d)(1)–(2) (2007 & Supp. 2014).  ASORA allowed the 
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actual costs and to be set at a level that did not discourage offenders from registering.  ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 18.65.087(d)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2014). 
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registration was required for aggravated offenses.  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010(d)(1)–(2) (2007 
& Supp. 2014). 
 172.   See Prescott, supra note 155 at 1039–40. 
 173.   See Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55, 
55 (2017). 
 174.   Id. (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)). 
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renewal, consideration for child custody determinations, and more 
burdensome penalties for violations, the Supreme Court of the United 
States should be able to distinguish KORA from ASORA.175  Because 
KORA’s requirements are more burdensome than those previously 
analyzed by the Court, the Court should re-analyze the “rational 
connection to a non-punitive purpose” factor.  In doing so, the Court 
would be compelled to use recent empirical research that severely 
undermines the argument used in Smith stating that registries are a 
legitimate way to ensure public safety.  This weakened argument then 
must go up against a stronger argument that KORA is punitive given its 
harsher requirements.  The weak argument that registrations serve the 
purpose of increasing public safety would not override the obvious 
punitive effects KORA’s requirements impose on offenders.  This factor, 
therefore, should be weighed in favor of KORA being punitive. 
3. Excessive in Relation to its Purpose 
In light of recent empirical evidence, the “excessive in relation to its 
purpose” factor should also be analyzed differently by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  The Smith Court was analyzing a statute that 
was less onerous than KORA.176  Even without modern empirical data, 
the Court could decide that KORA’s increased requirements, such as in-
person reporting, are excessive in relation to its purpose of promoting 
public safety.177  With modern research, however, the Supreme Court 
would have ample evidence to decide that KORA is excessive in relation 
to its purpose of public safety. 
Modern empirical evidence would support weighing this factor in 
favor of KORA being punitive.  The empirical evidence of sex offenders 
posing a low risk of recidivism and registries providing no assurance for 
public safety—and even decreasing public safety—leave no room for 
argument that registrations have a reasonable purpose of regulation.  The 
Supreme Court should thus hold that KORA is punitive because its 
requirements are excessive and pose no relation to the purpose of public 
safety. 
Distinguishing KORA from ASORA allows the Court to hold that 
KORA is punitive without overturning a decade’s worth of precedent 
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under Smith.  However, even if the Court ignores the new empirical 
evidence that make the “rational relation to a non-punitive purpose” and 
“excessive in relation to its purpose” factors weigh in favor of finding 
KORA’s requirements more punitive, KORA also is distinguishable 
because it sweeps more broadly than ASORA. 
B. KORA Sweeps More Broadly 
The most distinguishable aspect of KORA from ASORA is that 
KORA sweeps more broadly in requiring violent offenders and drug 
offenders to register under the act.178  ASORA, like most states, only 
requires sex offenders to register.  The Petersen-Beard court misapplies 
the excessiveness and non-punitive purpose factors of Mendoza-Martinez 
to KORA by neglecting to distinguish KORA from ASORA insofar as 
the reach KORA has over non-sex-based crimes.179 
The United States Supreme Court should engage in an analysis of 
KORA’s application to violent offenders and drug offenders under 
Mendoza-Martinez factors.  The Court should find that the Kansas 
Legislature must have intended to create additional punishment as a 
result of certain violent and drug convictions given its broad range of 
offenses.  Further, the Kansas Legislature provided no supportive data 
that these classes of offenders pose a uniquely high risk of recidivism.  
The Legislature also failed to include any legislative intent within the 
Act.180  Without this supportive data or an express intent, there is no 
proof the Kansas Legislature required registration to prevent recidivism 
and promote public safety. 
1. Intent of the Legislature 
The application of KORA to violent offenders and drug offenders 
undercuts any conclusion that the aim or effect of KORA is to protect the 
public.  Instead, the application to certain violent and drug offenses 
evidences an ulterior motive to enhance the consequences of committing 
the offenses under the Act.  The violent offender category and drug 
offender category reach a broad range of offenses.  These broad offenses, 
                                                        
 178.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(a)(2), (3) (West 2017 & Supp.). 
 179.   While the defendant in Petersen-Beard did not challenge KORA’s reach to violent and 
drug offenders, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that KORA was non-punitive and cited in 
subsequent cases regarding the constitutionality of KORA to the Petersen-Beard opinion.  State v. 
Huey, 399 P.3d 211, 215 (Kan. 2017).  
 180.   Thompson, 373 P.3d at 758. 
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however, are comprised of an even broader range of acts required to 
commit the offense.  The Act encompasses these various offenses and the 
acts required to commit them without making any connection towards 
their continung threat to the public’s safety. 
In the violent offender category, for example, KORA requires 
anyone convicted of involuntary manslaughter to register for fifteen 
years.181  Involuntary manslaughter, however, encompasses a broad 
range of acts in order to commit the offense.182  Acts resulting in 
convictions of involuntary manslaughter can range from the death of a 
human being in an accident caused by a driver texting while driving, to 
death caused during the commission of an aggravated robbery or rape.  
While both acts have an unfortunate consequence, it is not intuitive that 
both warrant the same amount of risk in recidivating.  Therefore, it is not 
intuitive that the Kansas Legislature included violent offenders, such as 
those who have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter, to register 
under KORA for regulatory purposes. 
Similarly, the drug offenses under KORA also encompass a broad 
range of acts to commit the offenses.  Any person who is convicted of 
unlawfully manufacturing or attempting to manufacture a controlled 
substance must register under KORA.183  The Act, however, makes no 
effort to distinguish between those offenders manufacturing a controlled 
substance for personal use or for distribution to others.184  The broad 
scope of offenders reached under this provision is disproportionate to any 
public safety concern. 
The Kansas Legislature’s intent for KORA to serve a punitive 
function can also be inferred from the offenses that are not found on the 
registry.  If the Legislature’s goal was to protect the public from the 
offenses listed in KORA from occurring or recurring, then KORA would 
require offenses known to have exacerbated recidivism rates such as 
crimes of domestic violence.185  It is known that crimes of domestic 
                                                        
 181.   KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(e)(1)(D); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(a)(1)(J) (West 2017 & 
Supp.). 
 182.   Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being committed: (1) recklessly; (2) in 
commission of, or attempt to commit, or flight from a felony as defined in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5405 (West 2012 & Supp. 2017); (3) reckless driving as defined in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1566 
(West 2008); (4) driving under the influence as defined in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567 (West 2008); 
(4) during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. 
 183.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(f)(1)(A). 
 184.   Yancy, supra note 15, at 35 (stating that the personal use exception to KORA was 
removed in 2011).  
 185.   Domestic violence often escalates from verbal abuse, to physical violence, and even 
murder.  74% of all murder-suicides are committed by an intimate partner.  Domestic Violence & 
Abuse, U.C. DAVIS MED. CTR., https://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/hr/hrdepts/asap/Documents/ 
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violence represent an ongoing abusive relationship between the offender 
and the victim that often lead to incidents of physical harm or death.186  
Therefore, domestic violence situations pose a greater risk that a violent 
offender will continuously reoffend and ultimately commit an offense 
that KORA is meant to prevent.187 
Given the lack of legislative findings or published intent behind 
KORA, the Supreme Court of the United States should be inclined to 
analyze the Kansas Legislature’s intent from the offenses listed in 
KORA.  By examining the broad range of offenses encompassed in 
KORA including violent and drug offenses, the Court should distinguish 
KORA from ASORA.  Alaska’s Legislature professed its specific intent 
to protect the public from “dangerous” sex offenders directly in 
ASORA.188  KORA, however, gives no such reasoning or legislative 
finding.  It cannot be reasonably inferred that the Kansas Legislature 
intended to create a civil regulatory scheme to protect the public when 
requiring sex offenders, violent offenders, and drug offenders to register 
under KORA. 
Even if the Supreme Court of the United States were to find that the 
Kansas Legislature’s intent in enacting KORA was to create a civil 
regulatory scheme, the punitive effects of KORA and its reach override 
this intent.  The broad reach of KORA to categories other than sex 
offenders should change the outcome of the Mendoza-Martinez test to 
favor KORA being punitive.  Specifically, the Mendoza-Martinez factors 
analyzing the rational connection to a non-punitive purpose and the 
excessiveness in relation to its purpose should weigh in favor of KORA 
being punitive. 
2. Rational Connection to a Non-Punitive Purpose 
Given that violent offenders and drug offenders are different classes 
                                                        
Domestic_Violence.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2018); Intimate Partner Violence, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/violence/partner.aspx?item=1 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
 186.   See CDC, Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate 
Partner Violence Victimization—National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United 
States, 2011, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Sept. 5, 2014, at 1, 2, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6308.pdf. 
 187.   The national average annual number of reported nonfatal domestic violence victimizations 
is 1,014,073, and of these reported incidents, 664,518 of the cases had prior incidents of domestic 
abuse in the six months before the reported incident.  Brian A. Reaves, Police Response to Domestic 
Violence, 2006–2015, U.S. DEP’T JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (May 2, 2017), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5907.  
 188.   Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, ch. 41, § 1, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 41 (current 
version at ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014)). 
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of offenders than sex offenders, the Supreme Court of the United States 
would need to be presented with evidence as to whether violent offenders 
and drug offenders pose a significant safety threat to the public.  Further, 
there must be a showing that the offenses specifically targeted in KORA 
are constructed of offenders who are more likely than other offenders not 
included in KORA to commit a subsequent offense. 
This is highly unlikely, however, given available research about 
violent offenders committing the offenses listed under KORA.  For 
example, murderers are not known for high recidivism rates.189  Violent 
offenders convicted of homicide have a recidivism rate of committing 
any type of violent crime within five years of 21.7%.190  In contrast, 
offenders convicted of robbery commit violent offenses within five years 
at a rate of 35.8% and offenders convicted of assault have a 39.5% 
rate.191  Even types of offenders who would not be subject to KORA such 
as those convicted of burglary or larceny/motor theft have a greater 
likelihood of committing violent crimes within five years of their 
conviction.192  Therefore, offenders who are not subject to the 
requirements of KORA have a greater risk of committing the offenses 
that the Legislature is seeking to prevent by enacting KORA.193 
Considering this evidence, the Supreme Court of the United States 
would not be able to find that KORA has a rational connection to a non-
punitive purpose.  Finding that KORA had a rational connection to a 
non-punitive purpose would require an inference upon an inference.  
First, it requires the Court to speculate that offenders that commit the 
offense placing them on KORA will recidivate their offense.  Then, it 
requires the Court to conclude that the risk of an offender on KORA 
recidivating is far greater than the risk of any given person or non-KORA 
offense offender to commit the crimes covered by the Act.  The only way 
requiring registration of certain offenders under KORA would have a 
non-punitive purpose is if it reduced the likelihood of those crimes 
occurring in the future. 
                                                        
 189.   WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 107 (Stan. U. Press, 1st ed. 2009). 
 190.   See Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 2 tbl.2 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter Recidivism of Prisoners], 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510_st.pdf. 
 191.   Id. 
 192.   Id. (showing that offenders convicted of burglary have a violent offense recidivism rate of 
30.1% and that offenders convicted of larceny/motor vehicle theft have a violent offense recidivism 
rate of 29.4%). 
 193.   See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(e)(1)(A)–(I) (West 2017 & Supp.). 
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While the Smith Court had the Alaska Legislature’s findings that sex 
offenders posed a high risk of recommitting their sex offenses, the 
United States Supreme Court would have no such data provided by 
KORA.194  In fact, the available data suggests the opposite for violent 
offenders—those who commit violent offenses are less likely than others 
to commit a violent offense listed under KORA.195  If subjecting KORA 
offenders to registration will not actually promote public safety by way 
of preventing crime from occurring in the future, then KORA and its 
reach to violent offenders and drug offenders cannot be said to have a 
rational connection to a non-punitive purpose.  This factor—the Court in 
Smith thought to be the most important factor—should weigh in favor of 
KORA being punitive. 
3. Excessive in Relation to its Regulatory Purpose 
In examining whether KORA and its application to violent offenders 
and drug offenders is excessive in respect to its purpose, the Supreme 
Court of the United States should distinguish KORA from its decision in 
Smith.  In doing so, the Court should hold that KORA’s application to a 
broader range of offenders is excessive.  The question for the United 
States Supreme Court under this factor would be whether the regulatory 
scheme of requiring violent offenders and drug offenders to register is 
reasonable in light of the non-punitive objective—presumably preventing 
violent and drug crimes.196 
The Kansas Supreme Court in Petersen-Beard misapplied this factor 
when applying precedent from Smith.  The Petersen-Beard Court 
assumed that because the Smith Court found the regulation of sex 
offenders reasonable, then the regulation of any other crime thought to be 
dangerous was reasonable.197  In its opinion, the Smith Court specifically 
stated that “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from 
making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified 
                                                        
 194.   The Alaska Legislature wrote into ASORA that sex offenders posed a “high risk of 
reoffending” and thus regulating these offenders was a way for the government to protect the public 
since these offenders were the class of persons likely to commit sex offenses in the future.  Smith v. 
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2016) (quoting Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, ch. 41, § 1, 1994 
Alaska Sess. Laws 41 (current version at ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010 (West 2007 & Supp. 
2014))). 
 195.   See Recidivism of Prisoners, supra note 190, at 2 tbl.2. 
 196.   See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2002) (stating that “[t]he question is whether the 
regulatory means chosen are reasonable in light of the nonpunitive objective”).  
 197.   See State v. Petersen-Beard, 377 P.3d 1127, 1140 (Kan.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 226 
(2016). 
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crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.”198  The Smith 
Court’s only concern, however, was the categorical application of a 
regulatory statute reaching sex offenders.199  The Smith Court concluded 
that the categorical judgment concerning sex offenders was reasonable 
based on the empirical evidence it was provided.  This evidence stated 
that “[w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more 
likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or 
sexual assault.”200  Based on this data, the Smith Court decided that the 
categorical judgment of sex offenders was reasonable to protect the 
public from sex offenses.201 
The United States Supreme Court’s analysis of whether KORA 
makes reasonable categorical judgments should require a separate 
analysis given that KORA sweeps more broadly than just sex offenders.  
This would require the Court to examine whether all violent offenders 
and all drug offenders pose the same risk of recidivism and same safety 
threat to the public.  Unlike in Smith, the Court would have no legislative 
evidence to support that KORA’s categorical judgments are reasonable.  
The Kansas Legislature’s lack of a careful determination of recidivism is 
revealed by the vast array of “targeted” offenses included in KORA. 
Not only should the Court require that Kansas provide some sort of 
empirical evidence that violent offenders and drug offenders pose a 
greater risk, but that the more onerous requirements of KORA—such as 
in-person reporting requirements—are reasonable to achieve public 
safety.  While there is a lack of empirical data concerning the effect of 
registries on violent offenders and drug offenders, the same framework 
used to evaluate the effect of registration on sex offenders can be loosely 
applied to make a hypothesis on violent and drug offenders under 
registries.202  Findings suggest that registration requirements imposed by 
                                                        
 198.   Smith, 538 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).  
 199.   See id. 
 200.   Id. (internal citations omitted).  This data, however, has since proven to be incorrect and 
has been recanted.  Longo, whose assertion appeared in a 1986 Psychology Today article, stated that 
his article does not reflect recent research and should not be used as a basis for public policy.  
Sullum, supra note 152 (referencing David Feige’s documentary, “Untouchable”).  He also stated 
that the journal is not a scientific journal and questioned the Court’s practice of citing to a “popular 
psychology magazine.”  Id.  The Court relied on Longo’s article as it appeared in the Department of 
Justice manual written by a psychologist by the name of Barbara Schwartz. Id.  Schwartz now 
admits that she “couldn’t find any” information on sex offender recidivism rates and that she 
“basically . . . just made-up a model.”  Id.  She now refers to her work in the 1980s as deliberate 
indifference—a series of guesses that make no sense.  Id. 
 201.   See Smith, 538 U.S. at 104.  
 202.   See Prescott, supra note 155 at 1039–40 (concluding that sex offender registries may 
undermine the goal of increasing public safety by exacerbating risk factors associated with 
destabilizing sex offenders making recidivism more likely). 
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sex offender legislation may in fact be destabilizing to sex offenders.203  
Registration is de-stabilizing to sex offenders because the likelihood of 
detection of crime increases.204  While this makes returning to crime less 
attractive for sex offenders, it also reduces their quality of life.  This is 
because collateral consequences of registering as a sex offender are 
associated with “increasing poverty, loneliness, idleness, and 
disconnectedness . . . .”205  As a result, the reduction in quality of life 
makes reoffending become less costly to offenders and makes recidivism 
become more likely.206  This research suggests that the requirements of 
sex offender registrations are so excessive that instead of working to 
fulfill the purpose of public safety, they actually works against the 
purpose of public safety.207 
By loosely applying this framework to violent offenders and drug 
offenders, it is reasonable to predict that registries on this class of 
offenders would yield the same results.  It is reasonable to conclude that 
drug offenders and violent offenders would also experience a decrease in 
quality of life.  Drug offenders and violent offenders would experience 
the ostracism of being labeled a criminal.  Offenders would experience 
the collateral consequences as a result of this stigma.  The decrease in 
quality of life and continued ostracism would make reoffending less 
costly and may provide more benefits, such as money, that would 
otherwise not be available.  The result, then, is the same—the 
consequences of being subjected to registry requirements actually 
exacerbate the risk factors associated with committing crime.  Therefore, 
the data would suggest that subjecting violent offenders and drug 
offenders to registration is excessive to the point of undermining the 
government’s purpose of promoting public safety. 
The “excessive in relation to a regulatory purpose” factor of the 
Mendoza-Martinez test weighs in favor of KORA being punishment.  
KORA’s broad reach of offenses and categorical application without any 
sort of risk assessment actually increases the commission of these 
offenses.  KORA applies to offenders who, without experiencing a 
decrease in quality of life due to the consequences of registration, may 
have had little to no risk of reoffending.  Therefore, it cannot be said that 
requiring broad categories of violent offenders and drug offenders to 
register under KORA has a rational relation to achieving the purpose of 
                                                        
 203.   Jeglic et al., supra note 157, at 55. 
 204.   Prescott, supra note 155, at 1067.  
 205.   Id.  
 206.   Id. at 1063. 
 207.   Id. at 1078. 
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public safety.  KORA, then, can reasonably be regarded as excessive, 
and therefore, this factor weighs in favor of KORA being punitive. 
The Supreme Court of the United States should distinguish KORA 
from its decision in Smith regarding ASORA.  Most notably, the Court’s 
decision should differ from that in Smith on two Mendoza-Martinez 
factors: the “rational connection to a non-punitive purpose” factor and 
the “excessive in relation to a regulatory purpose” factor.  The Court’s 
analysis of these factors should differ for two main reasons: (1) empirical 
evidence regarding recidivism and the effect of registries has changed 
since its decision in Smith; and (2) KORA sweeps more broadly than the 
Alaska statute analyzed in Smith by including violent offenders and drug 
offenders under its registry.  Given these distinguishable factors of 
KORA, the Supreme Court of the United States should analyze the 
“rational connection to a non-punitive purpose” factor and the “excessive 
in relation to a regulatory purpose” factor to weigh in favor of KORA 
being punitive. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Kansas Offender Registry Act crosses the line between civil and 
punitive legislation under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Smith.  When 
analyzed under the Mendoza-Martinez factors, KORA cannot be justified 
as a civil regulatory scheme.  Although it does not impose traditional 
“colonial” punishment, KORA imposes punishment in the form of 
restricting an offender’s right to freely live and work in our society.  This 
restriction upon an offender’s liberty imposes a hardship that promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment. 
More research is needed to determine whether the goal of this 
“regulatory scheme” is rationally related to a non-punitive purpose.  Data 
available today suggests it is not.  The broad scope of KORA, which 
applies not only to sex offenders, but to violent and drug offenders, is 
excessive with respect to the stated purpose of the legislation, which is 
presumably to protect the public from offenders who have a uniquely 
high rate of recidivism. 
If the Supreme Court reviews KORA, it will likely distinguish 
KORA from the sex offender registry formerly reviewed in Smith and 
find it unconstitutional.  Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to 
KORA in light of more recent empirical data may shape the future of our 
criminal justice system.  Defendants, like Joe from the beginning 
hypothetical, may finally get the recourse they have needed. 
